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Abstract 
Different starting conditions and decision-making mechanisms of European and East Asian 
economic integration are identified. They have led to different paths of integration. The EU 
process had a major impact on political stability in Europe; it has increased economic stabil-
ity, at the expense of dynamism and possible over-extension, though. East Asia still has rather 
liquid mechanisms. This allowed it to exploit its economic potentials flexibly, relying on open 
world markets. With new problems on the multilateral level, East Asia reacts with various 
moves, increasing intransparency. Both regions have in the past played out their respective 
advantages well. Both face limits now. The former paths cannot simply be extended, and 
doubts remain whether convincing regional strategies have already been found. 
 
Unterschiedliche Startbedingungen und Entscheidungsmechanismen regionaler Integration in 
Europa und Ostasien werden identifiziert. Sie hatten unterschiedliche Pfade wirtschaftlicher 
Integration zur Folge. Der Prozess der europäischen Einigung hat maßgeblich die politische 
Stabilität gestärkt; auch die ökonomische Stabilität wurde befördert, auf Kosten allerdings 
von Dynamik und mit der Gefahr einer Überexpansion. Ostasien besitzt noch liquidere Me-
chanismen. Damit konnte es sein ökonomisches Potenzial unter der Rahmenbedingung offe-
ner Weltmärkte hervorragend entfalten. Angesichts neuer Probleme auf multilateraler Ebene 
reagiert Ostasien auf verschiedene Weise, erhöht aber die Intransparenz. Beide Regionen ha-
ben bisher ihre potenziellen Stärken gut nutzen können. Sie können ihre früheren Pfade aber 
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East Asia and Europe – comparing “apples and pears”?  
 
There are two good reasons why to compare East Asian and European economic integration, 
despite their remarkable differences in starting conditions, historical paths, and present chal-
lenges. The first is that multilateral integration and regional integration in various world re-
gions are intricately interrelated. To understand why East Asia has recently shown a great 
deal of interest in introducing free trade areas (FTAs) or even closer forms of regional integra-
tion, it is necessary to understand recent trends in the multilateral field, the progress of WTO 
negotiations in particular, and in other regions like the Americas and, indeed, Europe. (From 
this perspective, we should not be too concerned about which countries to include when we 
speak of “Europe” and “East Asia”. We are interested in rather dense networks of economic, 
business and political interaction, so “East Asia” encompasses North East and Southeast Asia, 
for instance). 
 
A second point is that East Asia may be able to learn something from European economic in-
tegration – both in a positive and in a negative sense. Either East Asian countries may find 
suitable solutions and approaches, or they may realise what to avoid. In this context, it is im-
portant not to superficially hypothesize that “more” integration is necessarily “better”. There 
may actually be too much integration, a wrong type, or a dangerous trajectory, implying sig-






2. Some theoretical considerations 
 
It is easy enough to draw a multitude of distinctions between integration processes in East 
Asia and Europe – or in other regions. However, which differences are meaningful, which 
consequences do they have, and what does this imply for the future? 
As for the forces behind integration, it can  
•  either happen spontaneously as market integration, 
•  take the form of functional integration, i.e. the tearing down of barriers making possi-
ble further market integration (Sannwald and Stohler 1961),  
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•  or consist of an institutional integration, involving the set-up of mechanisms and or-
ganisations to support and take care of different kinds of integration.  
 
Market integration is the most uncontroversial type to deal with, because the positive welfare 
effects are usually quite straightforward. As all parties engage in free exchange (to the extent 
they are allowed to), they will do so as long as they hope to gain. All actors involved can play 
out their competitive advantages. 
 
One issue is how to measure the degree of market “integration. “ Just pointing to an increase 
in trade volume may not be very meaningful, because the export and import propensities of 
trading parties may change as well as their sizes and because world trade in general may rise 
(or fall) due to a shift in transaction cost or other changes. Frequently, measuring the size of 
absolute interaction is distinguished from relative and even double-relative indices of integra-
tion, the latter relating actual trade figures to all trends mentioned above.  
 
Looking at such figures (e.g. Pascha 1995), it is interesting to note that compared to Europe, 
Pacific-Asia’s double-relative trade intensity was very low in early post-war years. Pre-war 
connections had been cut, and the development up to the 1990s can be read as a catching-up 
process to reach an economic exchange commensurate with geographic proximity. In this re-
gard, intensifying relations in East Asia were not miraculous, but just a return to normality 
(Pascha 1995). 
 
Of course, it is difficult to interpret these developments separately from functional integration 
through multilateral trade rounds (GATT) and unilateral trade policy shifts (reorientation 
from inward-looking or import-substituting policy regimes).  
 
We therefore turn to functional and institutional integration now. Both can be bedevilled by 
two critical points in particular: 
•  Is the level adequate? Do schemes make sense on the level of unilateral action, bilater-
alism, pluralism/regionalism, or multilateralism? 
•  Are the economic benefits of an enhanced integration (over-) compensated by gov-
ernment failure? 
 
Functional integration is usually considered less problematic for two reasons pertaining to 
government failure. First, it does not involve continuous government action, which reduces 
the possibility of repeated government failure through vested interests, misuse of policy dis- 
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cretion for temporary gains, etc. Second, it does not prescribe a certain action, but leaves 
choices within certain boundaries; this should increase the possibility of mutually beneficial 
interchange. Still, functional integration has a serious “level” issue, namely the well-known 
problem of trade creation vs. trade diversion. 
 
Conversely, institutional integration involves the strong possibility of government failure, and 
one also has to make sure to find the adequate level: Does action make sense on a regional 
level, or would the global, multilateral level be more appropriate? 
 
To give answers to such questions, we must consider why government action, i.e. supplying a 
public or collective good, is sensible in the first place. There are four major legitimising ar-
guments (Vaubel 1986 on the former three): 
•  International/regional economies of scale for providing a (public) good, 
•  International/regional externalities, 
•  International/regional cooperation failures, 
•  Non-economic goals like external security. 
 
While this may sound rather abstract, we can exemplify it with respect to trade liberalisation. 
For two given countries, it may offer either of them few advantages, possibly even disadvan-
tages, to liberalise unilaterally, while the other country stays protectionist. If both remain pro-
tectionist because of this “game” structure, they will both face significant disadvantages and 
forego important benefits from liberalisation. This is a prisoners´ dilemma situation (Krugman 
and Obstfeld 2003, pp. 235-237) that can be overcome through cooperation. A binding 
agreement would be preferable to keep either party from cheating, i.e. profiting from the 
other’s opening while keeping its own economy somewhat protected through intransparent 





3. Historical foundations of economic integration in East Asia and Europe 
 
Looking at the history of integration schemes – beyond market integration – in East Asia and 
Europe, a striking and well-described difference emerges. A core of six European countries 
has come together in the so-called “European Economic Community” (EEC) already in the  
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1950s (Treaty of Rome 1957), later referred to as the European Community (EC), finally 
leading to the EU of the 15 as of today, the 25 as of 2004, or the 27, probably including Bul-
garia and Romania, of 2007. It developed from functional integration, a customs union with 
some important aspects of institutional integration, as in agriculture, to a deeper and wider in-
tegration scheme. An important step was the Common Market project of 1992, and combining 
the real economy EU with a monetary union in the form of the common currency Euro (not to 
forget the somewhat ill-fated earlier European Monetary System (EMS)). The “institutionali-
sation of integration” has meanwhile reached the level of drafting a constitution contract that 
might, if passed, state the supremacy of EU over national law.  
 
There were other moves towards regional club building attempts in Europe. Examples are the 
now defunct Comecon group of Central and Eastern European communist countries, the ear-
lier EFTA European Free Trade Association of independent, smaller European countries, or 
the more recent European Economic Area (EEA) of smaller EFTA countries with the EU. 
Still, they all more or less reflected and reacted to the EEC-EC-EU process and can be treated 
in passing here (see, for instance, Pelkmans 1997, chapter 18). 
 
In East Asia by contrast, it has taken much longer to develop noteworthy beyond-market inte-
gration (for a helpful survey of issues, see Fischer 2003 or, more encompassing, Kwon 2002). 
The 1967 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), later enlarged, tried an institu-
tional integration despite some inner conflicts, and an attempt at functional integration, the 
Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA), is still not fully realised, particularly with respect to the more 
painful obligations. Attempts such as the PBEC (Pacific Basin Economic Council) were 
rather loose, and the 1989 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) is inter-regional, cov-
ering almost the whole Pacific Basin including the US. Its liberalisation attempts under the 
slogan of “open regionalism” and “concerted unilateralism” have remained a partial success at 
best, its organisational structure weak, mainly consisting of committee work (Pascha and 
Goydke 2000). There are few binding agreements; the decision-making style is consensual. 
 
Different types of integration (market-based in East Asia, functional and institutional in 
Europe) and dominant decision-making mechanisms have led to other differences as well, for 
instance concerning the prime movers of integration (table 1). 
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Table 1: East Asian and European integration 
   East Asia  Europe 
Integration Type  Market integration dominant 
Functional and institutional integra-
tion 
Rules  Flexible, consensus  Binding agreements 
Moves  MNEs 
National politicians,  
EU bureaucrats 
Government role  Facilitator  Leader 





Investment  Production network growing  Dense links 
Monetary Integration  Still weak  Tight (Euro) 
 
Why do we find such striking differences? In Western Europe, the established countries with 
a long tradition of inter-state treaty systems at least going back to the Westphalian Peace of 
1648 hoped to avoid a reoccurrence of war and fascism by all means, leading to a dense treaty 
network with strong obligations. The content was economic, but the spirit political. This aim 
could not be achieved without binding commitments.  
 
In Asia, on the other hand, all countries in the early post-war period were more tied to the US 
than among each other. Deep mutual mistrust let to rather weak interaction. This is in line 
with expectations from the realist school of international relations (Chan 2001): It expects that 
states mistrusting each other will prefer non-binding agreements, not putting all “eggs in one 
basket”. This also helps to explain the multitude of  such weak, overlapping cooperation 
schemes in East Asia.  
 
Moreover, the heterogeneity of states is more pronounced in East Asia than in Europe. While 
the 2004 EU enlargement somewhat changes matters, earlier EU members are closer together 
in terms of GDP per capita level than East Asia, the latter ranging from rich Japan to LLDCs 
like Burma and Papua New Guinea. In addition, at least the leading European countries – 
Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy - are rather similar in economic strength, thus neu-
tralizing each other somewhat. Again, from the perspective of the realist school (Chan 2001)  
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one might expect that the more asymmetric the distribution of assets and power (East Asia), 
the less inclined such countries would be to commit themselves with little leeway to defend 
their sovereign rights. 
 
Another, more economic factor is that intra-regional trade in Western Europe was – and still 
is – bigger than in East Asia (table 2). This raised the prospect for trade creation effects in a 
regional scheme for Europe, while East Asia with its high exposure to the world market natu-
rally expected much more from multilateral liberalisation. 
 
 






Source: Barrell and Choy (2003), p.5, p.12, based on Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF.  
 
In table 3, the realist regime of East Asia is juxtaposed with the “liberalist” European integra-
tion path based on binding commitments. Given the explanatory power of the mentioned fac-
tors, it seems unnecessary to refer to an “Asian way” to explain the different origin and con-
tract style in European and East Asian integration schemes. Such references rather resemble 
aspects of “symbolic politics” to defend the fairly weak mechanisms in place to overcome 
possible prisoners´ dilemma situations.   
 
 
21.3  29.6  38.6  Rest of the World 
7.3  4.0  6.5  Asia 
9.3  5.4  7.5  US 
62.1  61.0  47.4  EU (Intra-regional) 
2000  1980  1960  Export shares of EU in % 
18.6  32.1  Rest of the World 
15.2  13.4  EU 
23.7  21.1  US 
42.4  33.4  East Asia (Intra-regional) 
2000  1980  Export shares of East Asia in %  
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Table 3: Liberal and Realist Positions on Regional Integration  
 
Liberalism  Realism 




Focus on a Few Homogeneous 
Partners 
Diversify among Many Heterogeneous Partners 
Foster Cross-Linkages among Issues  Avoid Cross-Linkages among Issues 
Maximize Absolute Gain  Attend to Relative Gain 
 
Source: Chan (2001), p. 15. 
 
Is there something to learn for East Asia, despite the different regimes both regions have been 
operating in? If countries truly want deeper integration, binding commitments can hardly be 
avoided. Large groups of countries will find it very difficult to make such a choice, though. 
The European experience suggests that it is more promising to start with a small number of 





4. Recent developments in the trade arena 
 
In recent years, the stumbling new WTO trade round has put Asia in an awkward situation. 
North East Asia was, peculiar among the developed world, not endowed with traditional re-
gional trading schemes such as free trade areas or customs unions. Yet, another disturbing 
factor is the tendency  of the US to substitute multilateral trade liberalisation by bilateral 
agreements. From the US point of view, this practice allows it to avoid the, to some extent, 
unwelcome WTO rules and mechanisms of conflict settlement; furthermore it gives the US a 
chance to bargain for additional rights in agreements with much weaker partners of the South-
ern Hemisphere. 
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In order not to be left out in the cold, North East Asia has also started work on bilateral free 
trade agreements (for the more encompassing context: Park 2002, Seliger 2002). This process 
is complicated by at least three factors. First, a detectable competition between Japan and up-
coming China to consolidate their spheres of influence has led to hasty moves, possibly well 
beyond what economic logic would suggest. Second, the question of how to treat lagging, 
weak sectors that may suffer from across-the-board free trade has not been solved. Conse-
quently, the FTAs considered frequently encompass many exceptions, making them a dubious 
instrument to achieve significant trade creation (while also putting their WTO conformity in 
question). Third, as customs unions seem out of question for the time being, because they 
would involve even more painful decisions, free trade agreements need to involve compli-
cated rules-of-origin, raising fears of a “spaghetti bowl” of intransparent, cross-cutting FTAs 
that might lead to noticeable efficiency losses.  
 
What does this imply for the old question of whether regional integration is a stumbling block 
or a building block f or multilateral integration? Recent developments in East Asia suggest 
that the faults of the regional arrangements – particularly the lack of binding rules – may lead 
to very unwelcome paths once the multilateral process stumbles. A patchwork of bilateral 
agreements may be evolving that is at best third best, but may also lead to troublesome insta-
bilities. 
 
In Europe, the situation was rather different, regional integration always centred on the EU. 
Even for countries not wishing to join the union for whatever reasons, the European Eco-
nomic Area gave an opportunity to realise most benefits of economic sphere membership. The 
Common Market Project did not turn Europe into a “Fortress”, as many observers had feared. 
Arguably, some interested parties cultivated that fear as a bargain chip in the GATT Uruguay 
round and to make the EU a more sought-after partner in market-based activities. During the 
early 1990s, there is indeed a noticeable peak of incoming foreign, extra-regional investment 
in many member countries, including Germany.  
 
In more recent years, the upcoming enlargement towards the East has taken up much of the 
EU´s energy. What characterised Germany with its emphasis on reunification may now, to 
some extent, happen to the EU as a whole. With their much more “Southern-type” compara-
tive advantages, the East European economies will become an important “workbench” for the 
richer part of Europe, and trade diversion may be an issue not to be dealt with lightly. With  
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this regional consolidation progressing, it is difficult for the EU to keep up the same interest 
in multilateral progress, as there would be without the prospects of the European East. 
Summing up, Europe is in a more comfortable situation than East Asia, as its high degree of 
intraregional trade isolates the EU from the rougher world trade climate. It is understandable 
that East Asia tries to follow European precedence under these circumstances. However, it 
should not be carried away to prepare an over-cooked “spaghetti bowl” of efficiency-





5. Deepened economic integration beyond trade 
 
Both regions, in due time, took greater interest in issues beyond trade policy, for instance in 
terms of lowering the transaction costs of trade (trade facilitation) or making it easier to un-
dertake FDI (direct investment liberalisation and facilitation). That might involve not only 
goods markets but also important factor markets for labour, capital, energy and else. 
 
The tariff rates are already quite small due to several successful multilateral trade rounds. Tar-
iffs are not the most important trade impediment any more. If further progress in exploiting 
comparative advantage is to be achieved, more daunting issues affecting national sovereignty, 
have to be tackled. 
 
Another reason for this is the trend of economic globalisation with shrinking communication 
and transaction costs as well as new, complex inter-organisational structures of multinational 
enterprises. To make use of these potential gains, one would have to go beyond simple trade 
liberalisation, and a regional level for some issues did make sense, as geographical proximity 
offered some advantages (positive externalities) to utilise the new options. 
 
Still, Europe and East Asia took rather different routes. In Europe, the existing policy-making 
channels took up deeper integration, giving more importance to the central bureaucracy (insti-
tutional integration), relying on binding agreements among members, the most important of 
which was the 1992 Common Market Project. One reason may have been simple path de-
pendence, as the organisational devices such as the European Commission and the Council of  
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Ministers got more entrenched and structured the agenda as well as the decision-making proc-
esses. 
Another factor is s uggested by the neo-functional approach (Haas 1971): Interdependence 
among policy issues leads to an increasing demand for further institutional integration, and if 
such schemes have gained some reputation for reliability, it will be easier to supply new and 
deeper schemes. Moreover, different issues may offer more chances to strike bargains. 
 
However, this comes at a cost, because the danger of governmental failure also rises. Politi-
cians and bureaucrats realise ever-deeper institutional integration as a m eans to raise their 
power and influence. For instance, national politicians may be tempted to delegate “dirty 
work” such as agricultural subsidies to the European level, while Euro bureaucrats may be 
happy to take over additional work to increase their budgets and career opportunities (Vaubel 
1986). 
 
Such a public choice-view offers a helpful explanation of the frustration of many citizens with 
the European bureaucracy, creeping into every life sphere and spreading a thick blanket of 
stiffening regulation o ver the continent. “Euro sclerosis” (Herbert Giersch) is a well-used 
catchword of the 1980s. 
 
At hindsight, though, one has to admit that the EU has somewhat improved its image. This 
holds when looking at recent competition supervision, for example. Moreover, the Commis-
sion has been praised by many economists for insisting that Germany and France should stick 
to the limit of an additional fiscal burden of 3 percent p.a. under the statutes of the European 
Stability and Growth Pact. One gets the impression that the European level has become an 
important force to help pushing reluctant member states towards painful structural reform. At 
the same time, costly, grossly inefficient policies like the Common Agricultural Policy stay in 
place. 
 
How can this be explained? Pursuing a “self-interested dysfunctionality” on the European 
level comes at a certain cost for policy-makers, as the efficiency losses become ever more ob-
vious to the citizens, finally undermining this mechanism. During the 1990s, the EU was 
shaken by a number of scandals, most prominently during the years of the Santer-led Com-
mission. To repair their shaken image, it was a sensible approach for the EU authorities to  
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visibly follow at least some policies that could muster public approval, at the same  time 
weakening national governments that try to keep the regional authorities at bay. 
In East Asia, deepened integration was kept within the mechanisms of a “soft regionalism” 
(Robert Scalapino). Due to the eventual development of regional production networks, the ne-
cessity of such integration became ever more obvious, so we need some additional explana-
tion of why mechanism similar to the neo-functional approach would not work in Asia to 
overcome possible prisoners´ dilemma situations. 
 
Employing a realist perspective once again, it is understandable why countries living in rather 
asymmetric power structures would be hesitant to give up sovereign decision-making power 
in such sensitive issues. Deeper integration almost by definition covers policy fields with sig-
nificant domestic sensibility, such as competition, exploitation of the sea given certain territo-
rial claims, communication standards, media access through satellite systems, etc.  
 
Moreover, it was always feared that deepened production networks, e.g. by Japanese enter-
prises, would be used to gain monopoly power in weaker factor and goods markets, supported 
by superior finance, ODA or else. 
  
It is not surprising that there has been a vast number of projects and mechanisms in the area, 
for instance under the umbrella of APEC, but there is little effort to objectively measure what 





6. Coverage of countries 
 
With respect to the economies covered by regional arrangements, there are noticeable differ-
ences between Europe and East Asia. European institutional integration has grown in almost 
concentric circles, with few setbacks so far. 
 
In East Asia, there is a multitude of groupings, their respective boundaries criss-crossing the 
region. The most important arguably are the South-East Asian ASEAN and the trans-pacific 
APEC. Since the 1990s, there have been discussions of a Pacific-Asian grouping (encompass- 
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ing both North East and South East Asia). While earlier calls for an East Asian Economic 
Caucus (or even Group; EAEC, EAEG) by Malaysia’s Mahathir did not lead to concrete re-
sults, the Financial Crisis of 1997/98 led to new attempts. We understand ASEAN+3 as an 
outcome of these discussions. 
 
It is doubtful whether the patchwork of organisations is anywhere close to being efficient. For 
instance, the membership of the US in APEC and in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is 
largely based on its interest to make its influence felt in the region. Is there an economic ra-
tionale as well? It would be difficult to argue that an “optimal club” defined by common 
Asian interests, needs and externalities would have to encompass the USA. Without US 
membership, though, the question of intellectual and strategic leadership would have to be 
raised. For international organisations supplying a public good, there is always the issue of 
members hoping to take a free rider position. Which member would be willing and capable to 
take over an additional burden? So far, Japan has not made a particularly convincing job of 
supplying such able leadership in organisations like the ADB, even though it wields a lot of 
influence (Pascha 2002). Apart, it is an open question whether the rivalry between Japan and 
China can be a productive force – or whether it will rather be a destructive force – in such 
processes.  
 
Yet another issue is whether East Asian organisations would want to compete with multilat-
eral or arguably “Western-minded” organisations. When an AMF was proposed, such consid-
erations reached a lot of prominence. While such competition may be considered fruitful as a 
search process for the best solutions to deliver international public goods, it may still lead to 
perverse results. If an AMF would compete with the IMF for regional “customers” to accept 
aid, recipient countries may choose the help with the easier conditions attached and not a “bit-
ter medicine” with better long-term prospects. Reference to regional peer pressure rings 
somewhat hollow in this context. Such pressure may indeed work, if neighbours are influ-
enced through externalities (“regional contagion”) and thus deeply concerned about making 
their regional mechanism work. However, there may also be cases of regional collusion, in 
which neighbouring countries try to hide disturbing information. 
 
In the European case, the process of “concentric growth” may seem smoother in retrospect 
than it indeed was; it actually encompassed some rather unstable periods. There was a domi-
nant logic, however, namely the goal of the advanced member economies in Western Europe  
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to enlarge their sphere of stability, and for the more peripheral newcomers to gain secure ac-
cess to markets – and to transfer payments, in the case of poorer economies. This came at a 
price, because the stability hindered the refreshing wind of global challenge to blow though 
many laggard sectors. 
 
The ultimate challenge has been to steer the enlargement process to include 10 more Central 
and Eastern European countries, most of them formally communist and more recently so-
called transformation economies. The tendency for the EU to grow seems to have reached its 
apex. Possibly, there are already net diseconomies of scale – for two reasons: First, the neces-
sity to finance structural and regional assistance seems almost beyond the means of even the 
richest Western EU economies. It is still open to what extent EU help will be enough to raise 
Eastern European income levels fast enough to avoid a huge outpour of labour to Western 
Europe once migration will be fully liberalised. Second, the decision-making mechanisms of 
the EU have to be revised significantly to be workable with 25 – or even more - member 
countries with vastly diverging interests and resources.   
 
Whenever the EU circle gets larger, new boundaries and sources of potential instability are 
touched, anyway. In the EU´s case, the major open issues are Russia and Turkey. While Rus-
sia is so big and so different that it stretches the imagination to consider it ever joining the 
EU, it will be very important to find ways not to make it feel an outsider. As for Turkey, it is a 
poor and rather large neighbour in the Southeast of Europe. In some respect, relations with the 
EU are already close, for instance in terms of labour migration, but mainly for political rea-
sons the task of integrating Turkey seems formidable. It may be just as dangerous to leave 
Turkey out of the EU as to let it join. 
 
With respect to the necessity of reforming decision-making mechanisms, the EU has taken up 
the challenge to prepare a constitutional contract. There is a draft, prepared by an EU Conven-
tion under the chair of Valery Giscard d´Estaing. It may be said that the enlargement has 
made it more difficult to reform the EU, but the enlargement has at the same time proven be-
yond doubt the necessity of reform and may thus have even hastened the process to deliver a 
draft. 
 
Currently, it is still too early to tell what its fate may be. While important issues seem to have 
been agreed upon, such as a considerable extension of majority voting, other key questions  
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are still hotly debated. This holds for how to define “majority” (the “double majority recom-
mended by the convention involves a majority of countries, representing three-fifth of the to-
tal population), and for the number of commissioners. The constitution will have to pass an 
inter-governmental conference, national parliaments, and even referenda in several member 
countries.  
 
At the time of writing, the European Summit of Brussels of December 2003 has just taken 
place. It did not lead to the adoption of the draft and is generally considered a painful failure. 
Some countries (Spain, Poland), whose voting weights would be lower under the double ma-
jority rule than under the Treaty of Nice, found it impossible to agree. Other countries, 
namely the net contributors to the EU budget, have reasoned that the future budgets should be 
capped at one percent of GDP. This has been understood as a more or less open threat di-
rected at Spain, currently the top beneficiary of EU funds, and at Poland, the largest economy 
of the new entrants and thus presumably the largest beneficiary in the future. While a lot of 
political manoeuvring is involved, these developments do show how the enlargement is linked 
to the critical importance of reforming decision-making processes.  
 
There has been a debate on whether there should be clear clauses when to leave the EU. Intui-
tively, one would expect a better performance of a “club” if there were an exit clause. How-
ever, this raises moral hazard issues and can significantly strengthen the blackmailing power 
of individual countries (topical discussions of issues such as voting rights and exit clauses by 
German institutional economists can be found in Cassel and Welfens (eds.) 2003). 
 
As for another point of recent interest, France and Germany have signalled ever-closer coop-
eration, possibly in order to pressure smaller countries not to overplay their bargaining posi-
tion. This echoes tendencies that if an enlarged EU becomes inflexible, smaller clubs within 
the EU may move ahead. From an economic point of view, this seems sensible as long as it is 
not discriminatory to other EU members and as long as other members are allowed to join if 
they obey the rules of the sub-club. In an extreme case, a move towards various, possibly 
criss-crossing sub-clubs may undermine the stability of the EU. However, it may also develop 
into a flexible mechanism experimenting with innovative organisational schemes (after all, 
each individual country can be understood as a sub-club anyway that came into existence due 
to historical idiosyncrasies). 
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7. Monetary integration 
 
Another topic that can only be shortly covered here is monetary integration. Europe is obvi-
ously much further down this road than East Asia. 
 
Even in Europe with its background of real sector integration since the 1950s, it is still dis-
cussed whether it was ripe for a common currency in the late 1990s – and whether it is at the 
time of writing. In terms of the theoretical basis for an “optimum currency area”, it is quite 
clear that the current EU (with Denmark and the UK not participating in the Euro scheme) is 
not such an area (Jochimsen 1998). Giving up the exchange rate adjustment mechanism only 
makes sense as long as there are enough other channels to react to asymmetric shocks and di-
vergent conditions in various parts of the union (labour mobility, possibility of fiscal trans-
fers, etc.). After several years of experience, it is still doubtful whether the EU has reached 
such conditions.  
 
For instance, given sluggish German growth, the EU interest rate is too high to make Ger-
many grow stronger. It cannot be lowered, though, because there is stronger growth and infla-
tionary pressure in other, more dynamic European economies. Low German growth has led to 
significant unemployment, as the labour is not flexible enough to clear the labour market 
through real wage adjustment or labour mobility. 
 
Another well-recognised problem is the Stability and Growth Pact. It is indeed an important 
addition to the Maastricht Treaty rules on monetary union, because without the pact, member 
countries could avoid the stringency of a tight monetary policy by ever more pronounced 
deficit spending. From a market-based point of view, even without a pact each government 
should be controlled by the financial markets: If it engages in too much deficit-spending, the 
interest rates on its bonds should rise and debt financing should become ever more costly. Ac-
cording to Maastricht, the European Central Bank (ECB) is not allowed to bail out a national 
government, so this market mechanism should be able to put strings on national politicians. 
However, one cannot but observe that the interest rates on the national debt of the different 
Euro economies show only minor differences. It can be inferred that financial markets do not 
expect the EU or the ECB to let a member country of the Euro scheme go bust. Hence, finan- 
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cial markets actually do not penalise irresponsible fiscal spending, and some mechanism like 
a stability pact is indeed necessary. Recent experience shows, though, 
that it is very hard to make powerful member countries like Germany and France comply by 
the decided rules of the pact in times of economic trouble. 
 
(It should be noted in passing, that without a monetary union, national governments are in-
deed forced by financial markets to consider their steps carefully. Irresponsible fiscal spend-
ing should soon have an impact on the interest rate and on the exchange rate, forcing the gov-
ernment to stop such an irresponsible policy).  
 
Given the enlargement of the EU, more problems can be expected in the future, as all new 
members have a right (and an obligation) to join the Euro scheme once they meet the agreed 
conditions. 
 
It was hoped that the pressure of the common currency would force member countries to 
make their (other) markets more flexible. However, this has not happened so far, and national 
governments have found it a convenient strategy to simply blame others (e.g.: the European 
Central Bank) for the emerging imbalances. 
 
In Asia, attempts at monetary integration are significantly more limited so far. The financial 
crisis of 1997/98 was arguably a sea change for such ideas. Contingency effects of currency 
devaluation spread through the region. While Korea’s exchange position was weak in 
1996/97, one might venture to argue that its situation was not critical enough to have neces-
sarily led to a full blown crisis – if not for the contagion effect from other devaluation crises 
(Indonesia, Thailand) in mid and autumn 1997. 
 
Steps towards further integration have been rather slow – but noticeable -, after the ill-timed 
proposal to set up an AMF. The Cheng Mai Agreement to establish an enlarged swap agree-
ment was a step in the direction of further integration, and so was the recent move towards a 
stronger East Asian bond market. 
 
Stronger currency cooperation could at some stage take a similar course as the EMS, namely 
trying to stabilise currencies within certain corridors. Given the different trade, capital, asset 
and liability structures of East Asian countries, it will not be easy to find a suitable position  
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between the US Dollar, the Japanese Yen, and – possibly – the Chinese Yuan. Moreover, it 
will be an issue whether with highly liquid international financial markets, such a scheme 
would truly be trustworthy in times of asymmetric shocks in one member currency. 
 
The idea of a common currency is distant, as the characteristics of heterogeneous East Asia 
are even more removed from an optimal currency area than the EU. Apart, experiences of the 





8. Towards regional peer monitoring mechanisms (ReMMs)? 
 
There is another possible interpretation of recent (financial and monetary) developments in 
East Asia, though: namely, that it points towards the ultimate goal of a well-developed re-
gional peer monitoring mechanism (ReMM). There has recently been a lot of interest in 
ReMMs in various world regions (e. g.: Williamson 2003). One reason is that the possibility 
of regional contagion seems to have increased. A further reason is that global monitoring 
seems clumsy, intransparent and faces concerns of legitimacy. Another factor are similarities 
in regional circumstances, giving regional partners more competence to evaluate neighbours 
than distant peers.  
 
However, there are also problems to take into account. Firstly, given the concerns of our theo-
retical reasoning in chapter 2, is there really an additional role for ReMMs sandwiched be-
tween multilateral surveillance and the monitoring by free markets? Secondly, the possibility 
of contagion does not only offer an incentive for mutual monitoring, but also to behave collu-
sively by legitimising each other’s policies. Drawing convincing institutional rules for such 
ReMMs is thus both critically important and far from easy. 
 
The European Growth and Stability Pact can be understood as an early example of a ReMM. 
As happened so frequently, the EU is an early mover with respect to global trends, and other 
regions have ample reason to watch European developments carefully. As has been pointed 
out above, the rules governing the Pact are far from satisfactory. Firstly, one cannot trust them 
to work in times of stress, as has been recently proven with respect to France’s and Ger- 
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many’s fiscal deficits. They depend on the states actually enforcing them, and the very fact of 
regional interdependence – or dependence on the major EU powers of Germany and France, 
in this case – lowers the possibility of doing so. Rules that are more automatic may be well 
worth considering to improve the Pact. Secondly, rules and trigger points seem to be arbitrary 
to some extent. This holds for the famous “three-percent-rule” in particular. Such arbitrariness 
makes it more difficult to publicly legitimise tough reactions in times of stress. Thirdly, even 
the economics of the rules seem somewhat dubious. For instance, an unconditional three-
percent-rule, irrespective of the situation in a business cycle and of the shares of cyclical and 
structural fiscal deficit, is difficult to defend with basic economic reasoning.   
 
ReMMs in East Asia, based on ASEAN, ASEAN+3 or else, are still in a nuclear stage. We 
would hope that careful consideration is given to the question whether rules which seem 






9. Some tentative conclusions 
 
As could hardly be expected otherwise, differences between European and East Asian eco-
nomic integration are manifold. It is interesting to note that the divergent starting conditions 
and decision-making mechanisms have led to rather different “landscapes” of integration 
mechanisms. On the background of NATO and the Helsinki Process, the EU integration has 
brought forward a deep trust in political stability. Another war among the former European 
archrivals, France, and Germany, drawing the rest of Europe yet once again into a nightmare 
of destruction, has become unthinkable. The EU has also developed considerable economic 
stability along its path, offering a high degree of intra-regional economic activity, at the ex-
pense of dynamism and possibly an eventual overreach of its capabilities.  
 
East Asia still has rather liquid mechanisms. In an age of progress on a multilateral level, this 
offered the chance to exploit the options of cooperation flexibly, going hand in hand with re-
lying on world markets. With progress of a new WTO round still dubious and the US turning  
  19 
unilateral and bilateral, East Asia reacts with an increasing intransparency of smaller moves 
on several levels.  
 
Both regions have in the past successfully played out the respective advantages of their pecu-
liar regional integration patterns. Both have now reached an end on this road. What might be 
the next step, overcoming the limits of the earlier paths and noting how difficult it has become 
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